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Telecommunications Privatizations: An
Overview
By THOMAS J. CASEY and SmioNE Wu*
I. Introduction
Privatization in the telecommunications sector is a growing inter-
national phenomenon. Unlike the United States, telephone service in
the vast majority of countries has long been provided exclusively by
government-owned and operated entities under monopolistic market
structures.' In some cases a state-owned company has been the ser-
vice provider; in others a division of the government has operated the
network and has provided service itself.
In recent years, countries all over the globe have privatized, are
privatizing, or are considering privatizing their telecommunications
services providers. For example, the U.K., Argentina, Mexico, Chile,
Venezuela, Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and New Zealand have
sold interests in their national telephone companies to private inves-
tors. Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and India have also
announced plans to privatize Hungary is just completing the sale of
a thirty percent interest in its national phone company to a consortium
led by Ameritech and Germany's Deutsche Telekom. Singapore
* Mr. Casey is a partner with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Horn, Washington.
D.C.. Ms. Wu is a senior attorney with MCI Telecommunications Corp. and was previ-
ously an associate with Skadden, Arps. Skadden, Arps has been retained in more than
twenty government privatizations in the past few years, including telecommunications
privatizations or pre-privatization studies in Thailand, Indonesia, Paraguay, Portugal,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, New Zealand and Venezuela, representing governments.
bidders, buyers and underwriters. In these assignments the firm has assisted in preparing
legislation, ministerial decrees, contracts, and other offering documents. In this process,
we have analyzed the substance of, and balance to be struck between, legal, sector policy,
trade, financial, and political factors; and we have come to a more complete and integrated
understanding of what is required to successfully conclude a privatization.
1. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Telecommunications Administration, Com-
prehensive Examination of U.S. Regulation of International Telecommunications Services.
58 Fed. Reg. 4848 (1993).
2. Private Phones in Europe, FuN. TisS, Nov. 10, 1993, at 15; see Stefan Wagstyl,
Indian Telecoms Network to Make $500m Offering, FIN. TnIEs, Nov. 5, 1993, at 24.
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floated shares of Singapore Telecom in November 1993.1 France, Por-
tugal, and Turkey also appear to be planning for some form of tele-
communications privatization.4 In addition, several countries,
including Hungary, Greece, Mexico, Venezuela, the U.K., and a
number of countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States
have privatized their mobile telecommunications sector by licensing
private parties to provide cellular or other mobile services.
This article examines the motivations behind the privatization
trend and the means and special concerns of telecommunications
privatization.
H. Motivations Behind Privatization
There are as many reasons for privatization as there are countries
that privatize. The primary economic theory set forth for privatization
is that private enterprise - and competition, which is often intro-
duced as part of the privatization process - better uses public re-
sources and is more efficient than government management. s
Enhancing productivity and efficiency is vital to a country's economic
development.
A modem telecommunications infrastructure is also essential to
economic development. Indeed, governmental ownership of telecom
facilities throughout much of the world has traditionally been viewed
as essential to national security. As a vital part of a country's infra-
structure, telecommunications facilities serve both public and private
needs. Adequate telecommunications capabilities are necessary to at-
tract international and domestic investment. Businesses must be lo-
cated where telecommunications infrastructure will support their
existing and planned operations. Investment goes hand in hand with
the existence, or development, of an environment that is conducive to
achieving a return on that investment.
The successful modernization of infrastructure requires an influx
of capital and the development of trained management and technical
3. Teo Poh Keng, Singapore Telecom Defies Sell-Off Fears, Jumbo Privatization off to
Orderly Start, THE NIKKEI WKLY, Nov. 8, 1993, at 23.
4. Peter Wise & Andrew Adonis, Portugal Prepares Telecoms Sell-off, FIN. TMES,
Nov. 24, 1993, at 7; Private Phones in Europe, supra note 2, at 15; Turkey Telecommunica-
tions: Growing Fiber Optic Market, MIDDLE EAST ExEcutIvE Rep., Sept. 1993, at 19.
5. Efficiency in this sense refers to both "static efficiency," or cost-effective opera-
tion, and "dynamic efficiency," or innovation and new investment. Mary M. Shirley, The
What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REv.
S23, S25-27 (May 1992) [hereinafter The What, Why, and How of Privatization].
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personnel. In some countries these are in short supply. Privatization
of state assets is a way of attracting the capital and personnel neces-
sary to develop the infrastructure. In the telecommunications context,
privatization often involves investment by experienced network oper-
ators, as in the case of the sale of a thirty percent stake in the Hun-
garian telephone company to the Ameritech-Deutsche Telekom
consortium. Total investment - financial, technological, and manage-
rial - by experienced operators is a way to bring an antiquated net-
work up to date.
Privatization is also a means to operate, maintain, and upgrade
the network over time without requiring government funds, which are
typically in short supply. In telecommunications, the avoidance of op-
erating and capital funding requirements can be a very powerful mo-
tivator since the costs of building the interactive, multimedia networks
of the future will reach into the trillions of dollars in the developed
countries alone. In the absence of new capital, these expansion pro-
grams must be paid for locally, which drains precious resources out of
frequently strained economies.
Privatization can also be an effective means of generating much
needed funds to reduce deficits or to fund other projects. 6 In Greece,
for example, two cellular licenses were awarded to private consorti-
ums in 1992 for a combined US$320 million. Not only will cellular
services be provided competitively to the public in accordance with a
government specified roll-out schedule and service quality standards,
but the government has also obtained funds for other uses. The sale
of a forty percent interest in Compaflia Anonima Nacional Telefonos
de Venezuela (CANTV), the Venezuelan national telephone com-
pany, produced US$1.9 billion for the government.
There are defensive motivations to privatization as well. That is,
forces beyond any single government's control are unleashing change
which cannot be resisted. Technology permits multinational corpora-
6. Compare The Wha; Why, and How of Privatization, supra note 5. at S27 (-If
priced properly, the sale of a public enterprise will only generate income in an amount
equal to the discounted net present value of any future income the enterpnse would have
generated for the government plus the scrap value of the enterprise.") This does not ac-
count for the fact that a more efficient enterprise offering more and better services could,
even at lower rates, do better and generate more revenues than the enterprise would have
as a government-run behemoth. This potential increase in revenues should be considered
in pricing the public enterprise for sale. Such sale could therefore generate more income
for the government than that which the government would have received from operating
the enterprise. In addition, the government may need the immediate inflit of funds from
a sale.
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tions or other entities to create networks that take valuable business
away from local public service providers. Also, regional political or-
ganizations may adopt policies that cause liberalizations in market
structure whether the national government is ready or not.
China's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), for in-
stance, serves as the country's long distance carrier as well as its pri-
mary telecommunications policy-setting body and regulatory agency.
It is also the liaison between the Chinese central bureaucracy and the
thirty semi-autonomous provincial carriers. The thirty provincial car-
riers rely in varying degrees upon the MPT for investment funds and
are proportionately more or less autonomous.7 It is easy to see how a
provincial carrier might adopt liberalization policies faster than the
MPT in order to better meet local needs. If several provincial carriers
initiate liberalization activities, the MPT may be driven to action, even
if only to restore a degree of uniformity nationwide. In addition,
other ministries and some large industrial organizations operate pri-
vate communications networks. It is reported that these Ministries
may be interested in interconnecting their networks in the future to
compete with the MPT's network."
Most privatizations are driven by a combination of these motiva-
tions. Each government privatizes differently because the priority of
its objectives determines not only the success of the privatization and
the conditions under which it takes place, but also the shape of the
sector thereafter. For example, if the state wishes to obtain large pro-
ceeds for its current budgets, it may be inclined to grant the privatized
company certain valuable rights extending into the future. However,
the public's interest in competitive provision of services and products
frequently conflicts with these special rights. Privatization thus re-
quires a state to prioritize, often for the first time, among important
but inconsistent values. Consider, for example, the flip side of the
defensive privatization coin - where the political climate or public
opinion does not favor privatization but the government wants to go
ahead for other reasons. In this case, "selling" the privatization and
its potential benefits to the public will be an important concern of the
7. Bill Bien, Chinese Telecommunications, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Tele-
communications (draft dated November 1, 1993).
8. 1d The ministries operating their own networks include the Ministry of Railways,
the Ministry of Petroleum, the Ministry of Coal, the Ministry of Water and Power, the
Bank of China, the New China News Agency, and the People's Liberation Army.
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government.9 The need to win short term public support may prevent
the government from pushing for other goals, even those of long term
public benefit.
Before beginning the privatization process, the government must
determine its goals in order to pursue the path most likely to achieve
those goals. Argentina began its telecom privatization, for example,
in an economic downturn with increasing foreign debt. The sale of the
telephone company generated significant and much needed revenues
for the government, and at the same time updated the antiquated tele-
phone network. On the other hand, even though British Telecom's
network was already modernized, privatization enhanced the com-
pany's competitiveness both within the U.K. and globally. Only after
determining its goals, can the government formulate a specific priva-
tization plan.
In the best case, privatization can achieve all of the above goals of
the government. However, it takes time, commitment, and effort to
achieve those goals, and in the short term, some or all of the govern-
ment's objectives will likely remain unmet. In Argentina, for exam-
pie, the privatized telephone companies ° still have service problems
and rates have gone up rather than down." In fact, service in Argen-
tina can still be as troublesome as it is in nearby Brazil, whose tele-
phone company is state-run.12
9. The privatization process of telecommunications service providers is almost always
conducted amid intense public scrutiny and comment. See Hilary Barnes, Danish Sell-off
Confronts Two Obstacles, FIN. Tams, Nov. 4, 1993, at 29; Telecommunications and Power
May Set Privatization Trend, E. AsiAN EXECuTIVE REP., Aug. 15, 1993, at 24 (discussing
Thai experience in telecom and power areas). The much talked about privatization of
Deutsche Telekom, for example, stalemated for years as the Social Democrats raised oppo-
sition to the plan. See, e.g., Ariane Genillard, Cross-Party Talks Clear Way for Sale of
Deutsche Telekom, FIN. Tmms, Nov. 6-7, 1993, at 24. See also German Government, Oppo-
sition Agree on Telekom Privatization, REUTER Bus. Rm,., Nov. 5,1993; Ariane Genillard,
Deutsche Telekom Hangs on for Sell-off Call, FrN. Tsms, Oct. 26. 1993. at 27. We in the
United States may not fully appreciate the extent of the debate over these issues in other
nations given that our own telecommunications services have always been provided by
private companies.
10. The national telephone company, ENTEL, was divided into two entities, Telefon-
iea of Argentina and Telecom of Argentina. One serves the northern portion of the coun-
try;, the other serves the south.
11. Douglas Feiden, Overseas Operators; Telephone Privatization Plans Could Boost
Service, Costs, CRAN's N.Y. Bus., July 19-25, 1993, at 21.
12. Id.
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Hi. The Privatization Process in the Telecommunications
Context
Privatization is more than simply the transfer of asset ownership
from the government to the private sector; it is a way to de-politicize
business enterprises. One common denominator of all successful
privatizations is the removal of the commercial, financial, and strate-
gic decisions of the business away from political considerations.
Normally, a modest change from a government ministry to a gov-
ernment-owned corporation will not be sufficient to break the control
of the political system. Private ownership, either in whole or in part,
has proven to be the most reliable catalyst to move firms to the neces-
sary level of efficiency. Indeed, privatization frequently means not
only the introduction of private capital into the company itself, but
also the introduction of private competitors into the market in which
the product or service is provided.
The discipline of at least some private ownership is essential to
de-politicization because private capital usually insists on the defini-
tion and adoption of a stable legal framework for the allocation of
rights and responsibilities between the company and the government.
Only by creating an independent framework for parties which is en-
tirely separate from the state, with rights enforceable under the law,
can the culture of the enterprise, as well as the relationship between
the firm and the state, be altered in a fundamental way.
The telecommunications sector presents a unique context for
privatization. The industry involves ownership, maintenance, and op-
eration of an extensive physical infrastructure, including customer
premises equipment (CPE); public transmission facilities (terrestrial
fiber optic, cable, microwave, and satellite); provision of services to
end-users; and the development, integration, and implementation of
technological advances to improve capabilities and services.
Telecommunications privatization can also mean granting licenses
to private parties for the provision of value-added, cellular, paging, or
other telecommunications services not provided by government-
owned services.
A. Regulatory Issues
In reviewing successful telecommunications privatizations, sev-
eral structural patterns emerge. There can be a tension between the
desire to rid the business enterprise of the distortions created by polit-
ical control and the state's unwillingness to abandon its ability to af-
[Vol. 17:781
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fect the conduct of the company. A balance lies in identifying in
advance the influence the state wishes to exert so that it is predictable
and reasonable. Telecommunications regulatory frameworks are typi-
cally enacted to ensure that the privatized company will meet the gov-
ernment's stated expectations.
For a privatization to be successful, the government must attract
the right buyer. Where a strategic stake is being offered in a competi-
tive bid, this is especially important because the buyer will be ex-
pected to commit not only funds but technical and managerial
expertise as well. The ultimate success of the privatization will de-
pend strongly on the buyer's intentions, commitment, relationship
with the government, experience, understanding of local culture, cir-
cumstances, needs, and technological and managerial capabilities.
Potential purchasers will demand a transparent legal and regula-
tory framework for the privatized sector and the privatization process
- including the process for making the investment, the day-to-day
operations of the company, and, ultimately, the removal of profits.
Otherwise, interested buyers will not have the confidence to invest the
time, effort, and funds necessary for the successful operation of the
privatized company. The buyer's investment is, after all, motivated by
business reality. The transaction must make economic sense.
As a result, the state's on-going regulation of the telecommunica-
tions companies should be separated from any on-going ownership or
proprietary interest in the company. Such independent regulation is
preferred by buyers and provides stability to the market. For exam-
ple, the Australian Telecommunications Authority (AUSTEL) existed
prior to the privatization of AUSSAT, the state owned satellite com-
pany, and the introduction of its competitor, Optus (a consortium
comprised of BellSouth, Cable & Wireless, and domestic Australian
investors). Regulations adopted in the privatization process turned
AUSTEL from a weak agency into a potentially strong one, with au-
thority over rates, interconnection, and other matters. The British and
Greek governments established new agencies, Oftel and the National
Telecommunications Commission respectively, as the regulatory bod-
ies for their telecommunications service providers. The telecommuni-
cations sector law ensures that the agency is independent from undue
political pressure.
Telecommunications legislation and regulation should clearly set
forth the company's rights and obligations with respect to the types of
services to be offered, the degree of market competition, rate regula-
tion, service quality standards, capital investment, network moderni-
1994]
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zation, interconnection, nondiscriminatory and anticompetitive
conduct, license and concession fees, national security and emergency
procedures, and public payphone installation and operation. The gov-
ernment's rights and obligations with respect to the amendment or
termination of licenses and the inspection of the company's operations
or facilities should also be specified so that both sides have a clear
understanding of their relationship. Hearing procedures that give ser-
vice providers the opportunity to present evidence supporting their
position and to be fairly heard prior to license termination or amend-
ment offer the potential buyers additional assurance. These issues
may be addressed in sector law, sector regulations, or the license or
concession granted to the privatized company or new service provider.
All laws and regulations should be drafted with an eye toward
conformance with international telecommunications and other appli-
cable standards and with the understanding that amendments may be
necessary in the future to ensure continued conformance. European
Community (EC) directives applicable to telecommunications are par-
ticularly important if the country is or may become a member of the
EC. These considerations ensure that the network will be integrated
with the global telecommunications infrastructure and will be able to
meet the needs of the public in the future.
B. Structuring Ownership and Control
The government's desire to maintain influence in the telecommu-
nications sector may also extend to wanting an element of direct con-
trol over the privatized telephone company. This can be achieved
through retention of majority equity ownership or voting control in
the company or through ownership of a special share which gives the
government certain rights, such as the British "Golden Share" or the
New Zealand "Kiwi Share." For example, the British Golden Share
entitles the government to participate in shareholder meetings,
although it cannot vote; to nominate a certain number of directors;
and to approve any changes to certain provisions of the Articles of
Association, including restrictions on shareholding and citizenship re-
quirements for the Board of Directors. The Golden Share approach
gives the government influence over major issues but, from most buy-
ers' perspectives, does not unduly restrict the company's
independence.
However, not all governments retain an interest in the privatized
company. The Argentine government, for instance, did not retain any
[Vol. 17:781
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equity interest or special shares. In such cases the government relies
on its regulatory powers to ensure that the company fulfills its role.
The government may also want to ensure that revenues are in-
vested back into the network and not unreasonably extracted by pri-
vate investors. Thus, restrictions on dividend policies may be
imposed.
In structuring elements of influence, the government must not
forget the essential purpose of privatization. If the government seeks
to retain too much control, its efforts to privatize will be undermined
from the outset. The buyer of a strategic stake will require a signifi-
cant element of control over the enterprise in order to justify the in-
vestment it is making. In Venezuela, this tension between the
government's hesitation to remove all influence and the buyer's need
for control was alleviated by forming two classes of stock. The Class
A shares represent the forty percent held by the strategic investors.
The Class B shares represent the forty-nine percent retained by the
government. The Class A shareholders are entitled to elect four di-
rectors and the president of the company while the Class B sharehold-
ers can only elect two directors.
In order to make the privatization more politically palatable, the
government may also require that a certain percentage of stock in the
telephone company be set aside for company employees. For exam-
ple, ten percent of the stock of the Argentine telephone companies
was reserved for employee stock ownership plans. Both British
Telecom and its competitor, Mercury Communications, have em-
ployee stock ownership plans. Eleven percent of the equity of Vene-
zuela's CANTC was placed in trust for its employees. An employee
stock ownership plan holds 4.4 percent of the equity of Mexico's
Telmex, and Telmex also purchased another 1.4 percent for resale to
certain employees.
Other ownership restrictions may also be imposed. Mexico, for
example, requires that majority ownership of Telmex remain in Mexi-
can control. The U.K. prohibits any one entity from holding more
than a fifteen percent interest in British Telecom. New Zealand pro-
hibits any one entity from holding more than a ten percent interest in
New Zealand Telecom without the prior approval of the Board of Di-
rectors and the government (via its holding of the Kiwi Share).
Where the government chooses to retain an equity interest, it will
typically sell between twenty and forty-nine percent of the company
to private parties through an open bidding or a public offering. Some-
times, in a two step transaction, the government will first sell a certain
19941
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stake in the company through a competitive bid, and then make a
public offering of either a separate interest in the company or a por-
tion of the interest sold to the winner of the competitive bid.
In Argentina, for instance, sixty percent of each company was
sold to the highest bidder; thirty percent was subsequently sold
through local public offerings; and ten percent was reserved for em-
ployees. In New Zealand, the government announced that it would
either sell a forty-nine percent stake in the telephone company to a
bidder and then conduct a public offering of the rest, or it would sell
the entire company to the bidder but then require the bidder to sell
approximately half of the equity to the public. The winning bidder,
Bell Atlantic and Ameritech, purchased the entire company and then
conducted the required public offering. An advantage of the two step
process is that a stake held by a strategic investor can build confidence
in the company and raise the value of the company for the public
offering.
C. Special Concerns of State-Run Economies
Countries with state-managed economies that have not previ-
ously had open capital markets, convertible currency, or other free
market features, may have a particularly difficult time privatizing.
Governments privatizing in transition from a centrally-planned econ-
omy to a market-based economy face special problems. Among the
most significant of these is the lack of market and legal structures
from which to proceed. This manifests itself initially in the practical
issues of establishing the ownership and valuation of telecommunica-
tions plants and facilities. Sometimes special privatization laws need
to be passed to enable the government to sell state assets, license pri-
vate service providers, clarify ownership of assets, and ensure an or-
derly process of privatization.
Assuming that the government is legally authorized to proceed,
one of the first tasks to be undertaken in order to sell the stock of a
state-owned telephone company to private parties is to determine the
assets of the company. Such a determination is particularly difficult
because general state ownership of all factors of production have
blurred the lines of asset ownership between different state-owned en-
tities. Also, regardless of whether the sale is conducted through open
bidding, one-on-one negotiations, or public offerings, the market
value of these assets and the company's operations must be estab-
lished. In some instances, governments accustomed to a centrally-
planned economy have found it difficult to adjust to the concept of
[Vol. 17:781
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"market value" as opposed to either what it paid for the assets origi-
nally, some calculation of the "inherent" worth of the assets, or asset
replacement value.13
State-owned economies often have little or no experience in fash-
ioning an independent legal system conducting the privatization trans-
actions, or regulating the new private sector. The legal, financial,
public relations, and marketing advisors that play a crucial role in the
success of any privatization are especially important to guide state-run
economies through the privatization process. Such advisors must un-
derstand the individual needs of the local community and their client,
whether it is the government or the bidder. Experienced advisors
should bring to their assignments an awareness of the many methods
of accomplishing the various functions associated with privatization.
Since such privatizations are political processes, advisors must bring a
political sensitivity to their work as well.
IV. Conclusion
The wisdom of private ownership is now generally accepted. In
addition, essentially all the major telecommunications companies in
the world are diversifying in a more or less similar fashion. While
each is acting out its own strategic vision, these firms are riding the
inexorable wave of technology around the globe. They bring with
them the latest digital multimedia networks and wireless services. To
carry out their strategies successfully, these firms require relatively
open markets.
The high level of complexity in telecommunications privatizations
and the increasing competition for investors' funds and expertise
mean that privatizations cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Govern-
ments, buyers, and their respective advisors have to rely on the store
of experience gained from previous privatizations while continuing to
fashion creative responses to each country's particular circumstances.
The government's commitment to a successful privatization is
critical. After all, it is the government that will structure the regula-
tory and economic environment within which the privatization will
take place and within which the company will operate. It is the gov-
ernment that runs the privatization process, including establishing the
valuation of the company and preparing the company for privatization
13. See The Wha4 Why, and How of Privatization, supra note 5, at S29-30 (noting the
valuation problems of an African shipyard with government-appraised assets of S62 mil-
lion and prior-year profits of $3600).
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by making it attractive to investors through the reduction of debt and
the streamlining of personnel and other costs.14
When a privatization is successful, the beneficiaries are the con-
sumers around the world who receive the better services and lower
prices brought by global competition.
14. See The What, Why, and How of Privatization, supra note 5, at S28-31.
